EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by the Yale L= Journal Co., Inc.,
Edited by Students and members of the Faculty of tho Yale Law School.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $4X0 A YAR SD;GLE COPIES, f3 CEN1TS




EDWARD MYRON BULL WAYNE GRIDLEY JACKSON
Case and Comment Editor Secretary
JAM S WAYNE COOPER BENJABIN MAG ROBINSON

















ROBEriT A. STEPHENS, Jr.
T. DONALi WADE
The JounxAL consistently aims to print matter which prcse nts a vlcv of merit
on a subject deserving attention. Beyond this no collective responslbliUty I-a aumud
for matter signed or unsigned.
CoNTRIBUToRs OF LEADING ARTICLEs IN THIS ISSUE
ARTHUR L. CORBIN is Professor of Law, Yale University.
RoscoE B. TURNER is Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
FRANKLIN S. WOOD is a member of the New York bar and a former Editor-
in-Chief of the Cornell Law Quarterly.
THE SUPREME COURT AND UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
The United States Supreme Court decided last June that evi-
dence- obtained by tapping telephone wires in violation of a
state law may be used in a criminal trial in the federal courts.1
The question arose in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act. The basis for the prosecution was
information largely secured by federal agents who intercepted
messages on telephone wires leading to the defendants' homes
and offices. Five of the justices of the Supreme Court, in affirm-
ing a conviction of the defendants, held that evidence thus ob-
tained was not within the scope of the rule, superimposed by
I Onstead v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (U. S. 192S) (Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone dissented).
[ 77]
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judicial decisions upon the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, that
evidence taken by federal officers in an unreasonable search
or seizure is inadmissible in a federal court.2 Four dissenting
justices contended that the rule should be extended to control
wire tapping in addition to the more conventional types of
police activity.
The significance of the decision in this case arises chiefly
from its relation to the other interpretations of the so-called
federal rule-which the Supreme Court has from time to time
promulgated. The view that the Fourth Amendment was in-
tended as an abrogation of common law rules of evidence con-
cerning the admissibility of relevant matters is said to have
been adopted in Boyd v. United States.3 The Boyd case involved
only the constitutionality of a section of the revenue laws re-
quiring the defendant to produce invoices to be used as evidence.
The court said that the use of the invoice as evidence was er-
roneous and unconstitutional.4 But there was no discussion of
the relation of this dictum to the traditional common law rule
that relevant evidence is admissible without regard to the
methods by which it was obtained.
The Supreme Court first gave this relation its attention in
Adams v. People of New York.5 Although that case dealt chiefly
with the admissibility of evidence seized during an unreasonable
search by New York state officers, it approved the traditional
common law rule in quite general terms-and suggested the
necessity for limiting the application of the rule in the Boyd
case. For some years thereafter the ascendency of the Boyd
case dictum seemed in doubt. In Hale v. Henkel ( the question
of the admissibility of evidence was not directly considered. The
case concerned the grounds on which an officer of a corporation
might refuse to testify at a proceeding under the Sherman Act.
But the court thought a too sweeping use of the subpoena did
constitute an unreasonable search and cited both the Boyd de-
cision and the Adams case.7  The case of United States vi.
2For a discussion of the rule, generally, see Comment (1927) 36 YAMA
L. J. 536, and authorities there cited.
3 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886). In Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727, 732 (1877), a dictum to some extent foreshadows the court's attitude
in the Boyd case. But the holding of the court is on the constitutionality
of a statute barring lottery circulars from the mails, and the court ex-
pressly excludes any question on the admissibility of evidence.
4 116 U. S. at 638, 6 Sup. Ct. at 536 (1886).
5192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct 372 (1904).
8 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370 (1906).
7 Both cases were again cited in American Tobacco Company v. Werck-
meister, 207 U. S. 284, 28 Sup. Ct. 72 (1907), where the court held that
the inaccurate use of a writ of replevin did not prevent the use of evidence
thereby obtained. The question was raised incidentally in Holt v. United
States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910). Justice Holmes declared
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Weeks,8 however, elevated the dictum of the Boyd case to the
dignity of an actual holding. There it was decided that evidence
secured in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments could
not be retained by the prosecution if the defendant applied for
its return before trial. This limitation was thought to reconcile
the Boyd and Adams decisions.
But even this strong reiteration of the Boyd dictum and at-
tempted reconciliation of the Adaors case failed to settle the
doctrine. Justice Holmes showed new leanings toward the tradi-
tional common law rule in Schenck v. United St&tes,0 where he
said,
"Notwithstanding some protest in argument, the notion that
evidence even directly proceeding from the defendant in a crim-
inal proceeding is excluded in all cases by the Fifth amendment,
is plainly unsound." 10
And Justice Day in Stroud v. United States 11 unequivocally
refused to exclude evidence secured by opening letters written
by the defendant while in the penitentiary."-
The rule of the Weeks case received its strongest confirmation
in three cases decided soon after Stroud v. UnItcd States.22 But
almost immediately the rule was again curbed by the decision
in Burdeau v. McDowell,-4 which declared that evidence stolen
that even were a defendant ordered to exhibit evidence in a criminal
trial "even if the order goes too far the evidence, if material, is com-
petent."
8232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
9 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919). Shortly before the Schenck
case it had been held in Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 3 Sup.
Ct. 417 (1918), that the Weeks case could not be invoked to restrain the
government from using certain exhibits before a grand jury, which bad
been voluntarily placed in the hands of the court by the defendant in a
previous suit.
10 249 U. S. at 50, 39 Sup. Ct. at 248 (1919).
11251 U. S. 15, 40 Sup. Ct. 50 (1919).
12 "In this instance the letters were voluntarily written. No threat or
coercion was used to obtain them, nor were they seized without process.
They came into the possession of officials of the penitentiary under estab-
lished practice, reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the in-
stitution. Under such circumstances there was neither testimony required
of the accused, nor unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his
constitutional rights." 251 U. S. at 21, 40 Sup. Ct. at 53 (1919).
23 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup.
Ct. 182 (1920) (deciding against the use of copies of unreasonably seized
evidence); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921)
(excluding evidence taken by stealth from the defendant, by an army
intelligence officer); Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct.
266 (1921) (holding that the defendant's wife did not waive "constitutional
fights," since the presence of the officers was "implied coercion").
14 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921).
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by anyone other than a federal agent was admissible in a federal
court. 15
In spite of his dissent in 'Burdeau v. McDowell, Justice
Holmes gave the opinion of the court in Hester v. The United
States,0 in which he refused to extend the rule in the Weeks
case to exclude the testimony of federal officers who concealed
themselves in open fields near the defendant's house, the dis-
tinction between open fields and houses, so far as the Fourth
Amendment was concerned, being "as old as the common law."
Next came Carroll v. United States,27 in which Chief Justice
Taft found probable cause for the search of an itinerant auto-
mobile, and in which he declared for an historical interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment."" The decision in the Agnello case
frowned on a too liberal construction of a "search incidental
to a lawful arrest," but at the same time held that evidence
erroneously taken from one defendant could be used against
other defendants in the same case. 0
Justice Stone, deciding in McGuire v. United States 2
that the illegal destruction of liquor by federal officers could
not prevent the use of the amount salvaged as evidence, refused
to read the fiction of trespass ab initio into the rule of the Weeks
case. He said a prosecution was more than a game which might
be lost by a technical checkmate. 21  But, on the other hand,
the court in Byars v. United States,22 alert to avoid "judicial
sanction of equivocal methods," condemned an unreasonable
search by state officers because the participation of federal
officers was too apparent. Yet soon afterward the court in
Lee v. United States 23 found the evidence seized from a boat
at sea acceptable on grounds of probable cause. Justice Brandeis
said, obiter, that the use of a search light to disclose the con-
'5 Justice Holmes with whom Justice Brandeis concurred, filed a dis-
senting opinion on grounds akin to those each expressed in the Olmstead
case.
16 265 U. S. 57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924).
17 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup Ct. 280 (1925).
Is The Chief Justice reiterates this dictum in the Ohmstead ease. See
Olmstead v. United States, supra note 1, at 568.
29 Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925). See,
Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 612.
20 273 U. S. 95, 47 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927).
21 "The arguments in behalf of the accused concern primarily the per-
sonal liability of the officers making the search and seizure for their un-
lawful destruction of part of the liquor seized. They have at most a
remote and artificial bearing upon the right of the government to introduce
in evidence the liquor seized under a proper warrant." Ibid. 98, 47 Sup..
Ct. at 260. See also Notes (1927) 5 N. C. L. REV. 264; (1927) 75 U. or
PA. L. REV. 573.
22 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup, Ct. 248 (1927).
23 274 U. S. 559, 47 Sup. Ct. 746 (1927).
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tents of the boat was not a "search" prohibited by the constitu-
tion.2' The last case, in point of time, before the Olnzstc.d de-
cision, was Gambino v. The United States,- where the court held
that since the local enforcement act in New York had been re-
pealed, a state trooper making a prohibition search was subject
to the limitations imposed by the Wccks case. The court reached
this result in spite of a dictum in the Weeks case quite to the
contrary. 26
It is difficult from a survey of the cases to know exactly what
is the tendency of the Supreme Court in its periodic interpre-
tations of the federal rule. A number of cases indicate a decided
disposition to limit the rule wherever possible2 But the Gaw-
bino case and the Byars case show that the court under some
circumstances will resort to liberal interpretations to give the
rule a wide effect. That there has been a procession of in-
consistencies is undeniable. If anything could have been pre-
dicated as a result of the cases when the 01wstc.d question
came before the court, it was that there would be a strong
dissent, whatever the majority decided. The court has, since
the Boyd case, made almost any prophecy beyond this impossible.
The contention of the minority in the Ohzstcafd case, that the
rule should be extended to cover wire tapping, seems logical
if the rule is to be applied at all. Since the court does not re-
gard the decision as overthrowing the rule, it will be interest-
ing to see its future. Another exception is here engrafted on
the doctrine that information illegally obtained is inadmissible
in evidence. The suggestion of the minority that "dirty busi-
ness" of this type should be severely punished will readily be
agreed to. But the history of the federal rule indicates that
practical convenience and logical consistency will be better
served if relevant evidence is held admissible and thie offendors
who obtained it are dealt with in less devious ways.
R. J. S.
THE POWER OF ARBITRATORS TO AWARD MONEY DAMAGES
A recent decision by Judge lack in a federal district court
raises the question as to the power of arbitrators, under a
2 The decision in Marron v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct. 74 (U. S. 1927),
regards evidence, although otherwise tainted, admissible by the coincidence
of an arrest in the case. Segurola v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct. 77 (U.
S. 1927), refuses to consider the question of admissibility in the absence
of a preliminary motion according to the procedure prescribed in the
Weeks case.
25 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (U. S. 1927). See Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
784.
26 See Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. 3. 784, 789.
27 For a detailed analysis of these limitations as enforced by inferior
federal courts see Comments (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 536; (1927) 36 YTm
L. J. 988.
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general arbitration clause, to award monetary damages, where
they admittedly have jurisdiction to determine responsibility.,
The dispute arose out of a contract executed in May, 1922, be-
tween the Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co. and Bear Tractors,
Inc. for the manufacture, sale and delivery in installments over
.a long period of time of five hundred tractors. The arbitration
clause under which the dispute was submitted was a part of
this contract of sale, and provided:
"If for any reason any controversy or difference of opinion
shall arise as to the construction of the terms and conditions
of this contract or as to its performance . . . the matter in
dispute shall be settled by arbitration ... and the decision...
shall be final and binding upon the parties and a condition
precedent to any suit upon or by reason of such controversy
or difference."
Bear Tractors, Inc. was declared bankrupt in May, 1924. The
trustee in bankruptcy, alleging that the Mead-Morrison Co.
failed to deliver tractors in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, demanded arbitration. A majority of the arbitra-
tors decided that there was a breach of contract and awarded
to the trustee as damages a total of $864,792.35, including costs.
Suit by the trustee to confirm the award was transferred from
the New York court to the federal district court on the ground
of diversity of citizenship. The award in so far as it determined
that there was a breach of contract was affirmed; but the grant
of damages was vacated on the ground that the arbitrators had
no power under the contract to determine the amount.
This ruling is interesting in the light of the purposes and
tendencies of arbitration. The recent growth in arbitration is
the result of an attempt to create an efficient extra-judicial sys-
tem of settling commercial disputes. The passage of the numer-
ous statutes making arbitration agreements specifically enforce-
able 2 was effected by strong pressure on the part of business
1IMatter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co., decided May
23, 1928, in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New
York.
2 Specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate present and future
disputes is provided for by the United States Arbitration Act (1925), the
New York Arbitration Law (1920) and by the arbitration statutes of
New Jersey (1923), Massachusetts (1925), Oregon (1925), Territory of
Hawaii (1925), California (1927), Pennsylvania (1927) and Louisiana
(1928). See Sturges, Arbitration Under the New P6nnsylvania Arbitra-
tion Statute (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 345.
The Uniform Arbitration Act adopted by Nevada (1925), Utah (1927),
Wyoming (1927) and North Carolina (1927) does not embrace future
disputes clauses. For criticism, see Sturges, Arbitration Under th New
North Carolina Statute-The Uniform Arbitration Act (1928) 6 N. C. L.
Rav. 363. Future disputes clauses are irrevocable in most foreign countries.
See YEAR BOOK ON COMMIERcIAL ARBITRATION, 1113-1142, Annex IV (1927).
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interests, which desired a more expeditious and less costly deter-
mination of their differences by men expert in the particular
commercial field concerned.3 The ancient hostility of judicial
tribunals toward such agreements has given way to a more
sympathetic attitude. The courts have quite generally favored
this development by a liberal construction 5 of the statutes and
the agreements, and by a refusal to meddle with the awards
of arbitrators except in exceptional circumstances. The court
in the instant case admits the desirability of commercial arbitra-
3 See Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common
Law Rules of Marketirg? (1925) 34 YAL L. J. 480, 4S0-4S4; Sayre,
Development of Coimmrcial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YALE L. 3. 595,
615; Wheless, Arbitration As a Judicial Process (1924) 30 W. V. L. Q.
209, 209-211.
4 "The jealousy with which, at one time, courts regarded the withdrawal
of controversies from their jurisdiction by the agreement of parties has
yielded to a more sensible view, and arbitrations are now encouraged as
an easy, expeditious, and inexpensive method of settling disputes, and
as tending to prevent litigation." Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 62 N. Y. 392, 399 (1875). See Robertson v. Marshall, 155 N. C. 167,
171, 71 S. E. 67, 68 (1911).
5Thus, the supreme courts of Colorado and Washington have held that
a future-disputes clause in a written contract is valid and irrevocable,
although the arbitration statutes do not expressly embrace future-disputes
agreements. Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 630
(1925) ; State v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 25S Pac. 486 (1927).
A striking example of liberality of construction is to be found in Mat-
ter of Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 240 N. Y. 393,
148 N. E. 562 (1925). The arbitration clause provided that if any of
the arbitrators should cease to act as such "through death, resignation,
or otherwise," the party selecting him should appoint a substitute from
a certain list. The court found that the resignation of one of the arbi-
trators was unreasonable and calculated to frustrate the intention of the
parties as it edsted when the agreement was made, and the necezsity
of appointing a substitute was dispensed with. As the court stated, "The
letter [of the agreement] should be enlarged within legitimate bounds,
rather than limited, when the end in view may thereby be more effectually
accomplished."
Although not specifically provided for, the award of interest was held
within the terms of submission ("all actions and causes of actions, claims
and demands whatsoever now pending") in Matter of Burke, 191 N. Y.
437, 84 N. E. 405 (1908). In Tri-State Transportation Co. v. Stearns
Bros., 195 N. C. 720, 143 S. E. 473 (1928), the award of costs was aflfrmed,
where the agreement simply referred "all matters involved" in a dispute
over an alleged balance due for labor done. But cf. Garitee v. Carter,
16 Md. 309 (1860).
Cf. Forwood & Co. v. Watney, 49 L. J. (x. s.) C. L. 447 (18S0); Hey-
worth v. Hutchinson, L. R. 2 Q. B. 447 (1867); Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. Fenlon, 4 W. & S. 205 (Pa. 1842); Gerry v. Eppes, 62 Me. 49
(1873); Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah 8, 91 Pac. 683 (1907); Matter of
Smith Fireproof Construction Co. v. Thompson Starrett Co., 247 N. Y.
277, 160 N. E. 369 (1928). But cf. Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N. Y. 260 (1839) ;
Lauman v. Young, 31 Pa. 306 (185); Matter of Young v. Crescent De-
velopment Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510 (1925).
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tion. Yet, by a narrow and technical construction of the words in
the arbitration clause, it reaches a result that may impede its
development.
In cases of agreements for the arbitration of existing dis-
putes, the power of the arbitrators to award money damages as
an incideit to the determination of responsibility has seldom been
disputed.6 Judge Mack postulates a "vital distinction" between
such agreements and those for the arbitration of future dis-
putes. But the power to award money damages appears to have
been generally assumed in both situations, without distinction.,
In England the issue, in the case of an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes, was raised and definitely settled in Heyworth
v. Hutchinson.8 A contract for the purchase and sale of wool
provided: "The wool to be guaranteed about similar to samples
... and if any dispute arises, it shall be decided by the selling
brokers, whose decision shall be final." The wool was rejected
as not per sample. The arbitrators decreed that the buyer take
6 In Slocum v. Damon, 1 Pin. 520 (Wis. 1845), the arbitrators were to
decide "whether the said Slocum is liable for the damages occasioned to
the horse in question, with costs to abide the event." An award of $70
and costs was affirmed. The court aid: "It can scarcely be presumed
that the parties did not intend to submit the amount of liability with the
question of liability. It is not presumable that the parties would incur
costs and expenses in merely having a legal question of liability tried, and
then have another trial for the amount of such liability. Such a con-
struction is to be given to the submission, as to give it full effect, and
to meet the intention of the parties, which no doubt wad, to have their
difficulties settled without further litigation and expense."
In Colcord v. Fletcher, 50 Me. 398 (1862), the court voiced a similar
view: "It is apparent that the parties intended to refer for final deter-
mination and adjustment a claim, which plaintiff made against defendant
for money which he had received for insurance, and not merely the abstract
question whether there was any indebtedness, leaving the amount to be
otherwise determined. When a 'claim' is submitted to any judicial tribunal,
it involves necessarily the determination of the legality and the amount,
unless there is an express limitation of the power to adjudicate."
In Waite v. Barry,'12' Wend. 375 (N. Y. 1834), a submission of a "differ-
ence between them respecting the one-eighth part of a lottery ticket, and
the prize thereunto" was held to embrace the question of payment, as
well as the sale of the ticket and responsibility. See also Cobb v. Dol-
phin Mfg. Co., 108 N. Y. 463 (1888). The power to award money damages,
as distinct from interest and cost, was not questioned in Tri-State Trans-
portation Co. v. Stearns Bros.; Garitee v. Carter; Matter of Burke, all
supra note 5; Matter of Wheat Export Co., 185 App. Div. 723 173 N.
Y. Supp. 679 (1st, dept. 1919), aff'd, 227 N. Y. 595, 125 N. E. 926 (1919);
Johnson v. Noble, 13 N. H. 286 (1842).
7Thus, for example, in Itoh & Co. Ltd. v. Boyer Oil Co. Inc., 198 App.
Div. 881, 191 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1st. dept. 1921), where $24,034.85 was
awarded under a clause providing that: "Any dispute arising out of this
contract to be settled by arbitration in New York," the power to award
damages was not questioned.
8 L. R. 2 Q. B. 447 (1867).
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the wool at a certain abatement in price. The buyer contended
that the award was invalid. Cockburn, C. J., in affirming the
award said:
"But the parties have introduced a clause that if any dispute
shall arise it shall be decided by the selling brokers. What is
the effect of that provision? Mr. James would confine it to
the simple case of deciding whether or not the wools were, about
similar; but that is far too narrow a construction, and it
would lead to great inconvenience so to limit it .... It is quite
clear that it was intended that, if the wools should turn out not
about similar to samples, the brokers should have power to de-
cide how far they were inferior, and what reduction was to be
made in consequence in the price, so as to prevent any litigation
in the matter."
In the New York case of Matter of S. M. Goldberg Enter-
prises,9 a similar view was voiced. An employee who had been
discharged sued for damages. The employer demanded arbi-
tration pursuant to a provision in the contract of employment.2
0
The court upheld his demand and said:
"In the instant case I think the master should be permitted
to proceed in affirmance of the contract, and if the arbitrators
should decide that the discharge was not justified, they could
then proceed and fix the damages quite as efficiently as a jury."
In neither of these cases was the power to award damages
specifically provided for in the arbitration agreements.
A contrary view does not seem to have been voiced by any
court or commentator. The court in the instant oase cites two
decisions which, it is submitted, are not in point. In Young v.
Crescent Development Co." the court held merely that the par-
ticular dispute was not within the scope of the arbitration
clause.12 The same point was involved in the decision in Sonzcr-
set Borough v. Ott.13 In neither case was it decided that dam-
9130 Mlisc. 887, 225 N. Y. Supp. 513 (Sup. Ct. 1927), afd, 222 App.
Div. 729, 225 N. Y. Supp. 909 (1st. dept. 1927).
1o This clause read: "If any dispute or difference shall arise betwcen
the parties herein, no suit shall be commenced by either one against the
other. Such disputes and differences shall, however, be submitted to arbi-
tration in accordance with the laws of the state of New York"
VI 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 510 (1925).
12 The arbitration clause of the building contract provided: "All ques-
tions that may arise under this contract and in the performance of the
work thereunder shall be submitted to arbitration at the choice of either
of the parties hereto." The contractor claimed damages because the owner
had delayed him in the performance of his contract. The court said: "I
do not think that the arbitration clause in the contract should be inter-
preted as covering and including smch a claim as the one made against
appellant for breach of the contract."
13207 Pa. 539, 56 Atl. 1079 (1904). The agreement provided that
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ages could not be awarded when the dispute itself was embraced
in the particular arbitration clause.14
In explaining his unusually strict interpretation of the powers
of the arbitrators under the future-disputes clause of the in-
stant contract, Judge Mack attempts to draw the distinction,
noted above, betveen an agreement for the arbitration of exist-
ing disputes and one for the settlement of disputes that may
arise in the future, from the relations created by the contract
of which the arbitration clause is a part. In the former, the
parties know what they are facing and appreciate the nature
of their dispute, while "in the latter they are aware only that
disputes of many kinds, the nature of which is but vaguely
known, may arise in the future. Because of this difference of
context, it may well be that even the same words should be
given a different meaning in the two cases, broader in the former
than in the latter." The validity of the distinction seems doubt-
ful. As a matter of plausibility, parties involved in an existing
dispute are less likely to intend a broad construction of language
which has been employed in connection with a specific situation
than parties who use the same language in an effort to express
a general working principle to apply to the operation of a con-
tinuing general contract. But more important still is the fact
that business men entering into a contract to arbitrate future
disputes do forsee the possibility of damages. When they con-
template the settlement of such disputes, their interest is
centered on the pecuniary loss that may result therefrom. They
are not concerned over the breach divorced from its con-
sequences. Nor do they intend, in the absence of special reasons,
to take two steps in the solution of such disputes: one for the
determination of a breach and the other for damages. If the
law is to require arbitration clauses in commercial contracts to
cover contingencies with meticulous accuracy, it cannot but im-
pede the growth of a successful system of arbitration.
The apparent motive behind the court's decision is the fear
that adequate protection against injustice cannot be secured
the engineer "shall be referee in all cases to determine the amount,
quality, acceptability and fitness of the several kinds of work which are
to be paid for under this contract, and to decide upon all questions which
may arise as to the fulfillment of said contract on the part of said con-
tractor." The court held that the engineer had no power, under this clause,
to pass on a claim by the borough against the contractor for damages for
non-fulfilment of the contract.
14 It should be noted that the court held that the particular dispute was
embraced in the arbitration clause and that the court affirmed the award
in so far as it established "that defendant did not perform its obligation
to deliver tractors in accordance with the terms of the agreement and the
orders for delivery given in pursuance thereof, and thereby was guilty of
a gross breach of contract."
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unless the power of the arbitrators is kept within bounds by
a strict interpretation of the powers conferred upon them by the
arbitration agreement.'s It is generally held that the award
of arbitrators, if within the terms of the submission, is final
and conclusive, and is not reviewable by the courts for errors
of fact, or, in many jurisdictions, for errors of law.1 But the
protection of due notice and fair hearing has been thrown about
arbitration proceedings. 17 And "fraud" and "misconduct" on
the part of the arbitrators are grounds for impeaching an
award.18 These safeguards would seem to be sufficient to secure
Is Thus it says: "If the parties really desire, as to all kinds of disputes,
completely to give up the rights and remedies, offensive and defensive,
that have been created in the course of the centuries' long development
of our law, they may do so; but such an intent and the extent thereof
should, as it readily can, at least be made clear."
16 This is the common law view. Johnson v. Noble, supra note 0. See
(1928) 2 TEmPLE L. Q. 175. This is also the view under the statutes in
New York, New Jersey, Hawaii, California, and the federal courts. The
Uniform Arbitration Act, however, provides that questions of law may ba
reviewed by the courts; the statutes of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Massa-
chusetts, and England are similar. See Sayre, Dcvclopnczt of Conmcrcial
Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YAI.n L. J. 595, 613; cf. Whele-, Arbitration
as a Judicial Process (1924) 30 W. VA. L. Q. 209, 227-228; Matter of
Wheat Export Co. Inc., svra note 6; Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life
Ins. Co., supra note 4; Gerry v. Eppes, svpra note 5. Where arbitrators
are to decide in accordance with the rules of law, their decision in that
respect is everywhere open to review. See Dodds v. Hakes, lpr a note
5. In Connor v. Simpson, 104 Pa. 440 (1883), the award was set aside
because the arbitrator refused to settle a question of law that had been
submitted. In Matter of Wenger v. Propper S. H. Mills, 239 N. Y. 199,
146 N. E. 203 (1924), the arbitrators had jurisdiction even though it
seems that there would have been no action at law.
v Cf. Curran v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 111, 107 Atl. 636 (1919); North
Braddock Borough v. Corey, 205 Pa. 35, 54 Atl. 486 (1903).
's Grounds for vacating an award under the New York Statute (N. Y.
C. P. A. § 1457) are as follows:
"1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means.
"2. Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitratorz
or either of them.
"3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
"4. Where the arbitrators have exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made."
Awards may be modified or corrected (N. Y. C. P. A. § 1458):
"1. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to
in the award.
"2. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted
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for business as equitable and just a settlement of its disputes
as could be secured in the regular courts of justice. Where an
award cannot be impeached on any of these grounds, it seems
undesirable to have the courts review the merits of the con-
troversy by giving a narrow interpretation to the grant of juris-
diction contained in the arbitration agreement. Business men,
when entering into such agreements, intend them to be inter-
preted liberally, and it is only after a dispute has arisen, in
which those on one side find a technical advantage in litigation,
that they become advocates of strict construction.
In the instant case the court found that the particular dispute
was one within the terms of the arbitration agreement. The
agreement stated that the arbitrators were to "settle" such
disputes, their decision to be "final and binding." To hold that
the award of damages is not a necessary concomitant of such
a power is a refinement foreign to the spirit in which arbitra-
tion agreements are made. The growth of commercial arbitra-
tion under liberal statutes and sympathetic courts has proved
satisfactory to the commercial interests concerned. No reason
has been adduced for a change of policy at this time.
WHAT IS "GENERAL LAW" WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF SWIFT V.
TYSON?
By what now appears to have been a misconception" of the
purpose of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,2 which makes
"the laws of the several states ... rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States," Justice Story,
in Swift v. Tyson,3 enunciated a doctrine which hag never ceased
to distress theorists 4 while being constantly applied and ex-
to them, not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters sub-
mitted.
"3. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy, and, if it had been a referee's report, the defect
could have been amended or disregarded by the court."
The federal statute is substantially similar. See Poor, Arbitration
Under the Federal Statute (1927) 36 YAIE L. J. 667, 669. The maling
of an independent investigation of the facts by an arbitrator has been
held to justify the setting aside of the award. Berizzi Co. v. Krausz, 239
N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925), criticized in (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 905.
See Strong v. Strong, 63 Mass. 560 (1852).
"See, Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Aot
of 1789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 81 et seq., based on original memor-
anda.
244 Stat. 935 (1926). See 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1928) for comprehensive
note on the whole problem.
3 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842). The case involved negotiable paper, but the
opinion went far beyond to include "general commercial law."
4 For a full criticism of the "chaos" resulting from the doctrine, see
Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law (1911)
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tended by judges.5 The distinction was there drawn, as to non-
statutory questions," in cases where jurisdiction of the federal
courts depends on diversity of citizenship, between "local law,"
in which the federal courts are bound 7 to follow the decisions 0
of the highest courts of the state where the issue arose, and
"general commercial law," in which they should form inde-
pendent judgmentsf The chief objection to the doctrine is of
course that there may be two rules in force in the same state
as to one question, depending on whether suit is brought in the
federal or state court. 10
The recent case of Black & White Taxi. & T. Co. v. Bown
45 AB'. L. REV. 47; see also GRAY, THE NATURE A.D Souncris or THE
LAW (2d. ed. 1921) 249-259; Carpenter, Court Decisons and the Conmnon
Law (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 593, 602; Rand, Swift v. Tyson ' cmfu
Gelpcke v. Dubuqv.e (1895) 8 H.nv. L. REv. 323. The most recent de-
nunciation of the doctrine is contained in Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 COMru.
L. Q. 499, 524 et seq., with especial reference to the case under discussion
here, which he terms "its extreme limit." But as to this point, see infra
note 16. The doctrine has received energetic support from Prof. Henry
Schofield; see articles cited infra notes 30 and 31.
z Judges have by no means been unanimous. There were vigorous dis-
senting opinions in the following important cases: Baltimore & 0. R. R.
v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 36S, 13 Sup. Ct. 914 (1893); Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1910). In Salem Co. v. Manu-
facturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup. Ct. 266 (1924), two
judges concurred in the result while disapproving of the argument.
6 Statutes alone were considered by Story within the meaning of the
word "laws" in the Judiciary Act. For a full discussion of the problem
of how far a federal court will follow state decisions on the state's
statutory law, see Comment (1928) 37 YAM L. J. 1121.
7R is open to question whether they are "bound" under the provision
of the Judiciary Act, or as a mere matter of conity. See infra note 49.
8 The nature of the state decisions, and their relation in time to the
accrual of rights, are important factors in the application of the doctrine,
as is also the character of the tribunal. See Note (1926) 40 L v. L.
Ruv. 310. The rule must rest on a settled line of decisions, not be
merely discussed or "foreshadowed." Rowan v. Galveston, 13 F. (2d)
257 (S. D. Tex. 1926).
0 The early rule seems to have held decisions of state courts as bind-
ing as statutes. Mandeville v. Riddle, 1 Cranch 290 (U. S. 1803). But
Story had some basis of authority for his interpretation. Cf. Jackson
v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 167 (U. S. 1827). For motives in his decision
see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 253.
10 "What is to be said of a civilized society where, upon precisely the
same state of facts a court on one side of the street will decide in favor
of plaintiff, and a court on the other side of the street will decide in
favor of the defendant?" See Hornblower, Con lkt be tween FM- ' rWd and
State Decisions (1880) 14 Ams. L. REv. 211, 223. One of the most notable
examples of this conflict is on the question of negotiable paper raied in
Swift v. Tyson itself, the New York courts having continued to follow
their own rule until the passage of a Negotiable Instruments Law in
1897 in accord with the federal rule. Cf. infra note 31.
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& Yellow Taxi. & T. Co. 11 shows the doctrine1 2 still apparently
as firmly settled as ever, but still as capable of arousing a deter-
mined opposition. In this case the plaintiff, a Kentucky cor-
poration, by reincorporating in a neighboring state 13 and
thereupon bringing suit in the federal court,14 was able to secure
enforcement of a contract of a type that had long been con-
sidered invalid by the Kentucky courts as contrary to public
policy.15" The majorit of the Supreme Court held that the
question was one of "general law" as to which they were not
bound by the state decisions.1 ' Justice Holmes, in a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Justices Stone and Brandeis, denounced
11276 U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928), aff'g 15 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A.
6th, 1926).
12 The doctrine applies as to the substantive law involved though thia
was a suit in equity. Cf. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct.
526 (1915); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S.
458, 45 Sup. Ct. 543 (1925).
13 The court held that the plaintiff's motives would not be enquired into
and that the reincorporation was not collusive. On this aspect of the
case, see (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 87'7.
1 'Such abuses of the federal jurisdiction are undoubtedly encouraged
by the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. Cf. Little v, Giles, 118 U. S. 596,
7 Sup. Ct. 32 (1886). In Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S. 505 (1881),
a non-resident plaintiff was apparently created out of thin air. The
instant case shows in a striking way how the doctrine "makes the adminis-
tration of justice a game, where the event depends on the skill of the
players." 2 HARE, AMiERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1889) 1119.
is Cf. McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465, 18 S. W. 15 (1892). The
contract involved was with a Kentucky railroad, granting the plaintiff
taxicab company exclusive privileges in soliciting patronage at the former's
station.
16 The court's decision that the contract was valid is in accord with
the authorities. See Note (1908) 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 777. But whether
the court was justified in holding the question one of "general law,"
on which it could exercise its independent judgment, is nob so clear.
Contracts, especially those made by carriers, are usually considered general
questions. New York Cent. R. R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S.
1873). And there is one other instance where a contract of the kind
under discussion was considered as a question of "general law." Skaggs
v. Kansas City Terminal R. R., 233 Fed. 827 (W. D. Mo. 1916). But
that case did not arise by diversity of citizenship and should not control.
On the other hand, contracts involving real property, especially where the
state's public policy is said to be at stake, are often treated as local
questions. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R., 175
U. S. 91, 20 Sup. Ct 33 (1899). The instant case might perhaps come
within that category, as Justice Holmes shows .in his dissenting opinion:
"I should have supposed that what arrangements could or could not be
made for the use of a piece of land was a purely local question, on which
if on anything the state courts should be taken to declare what the state
wills." But this argument was apparently brought in as an afterthought
by Justice Holmes, and does not appear to be very well supported. If
the term "general law" is ever to be applied, it would seem that it could
be applied here without inconsistency.
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as "a subtle fallacy" the theory of "a transcendental body of
law outside of any particular state, but obligatory within it," "
to which the majority were appealing in deciding the question
independently of the state rule.
Though the courts in making such independent judgments
assert that there is no federal common law,1 and claim instead
that they are expressing the state's own common law,20 it seems
clear that they are in fact looking to some "transcendental body
of law" when they apply the Swift v. Tyson rule. And whether
this be called "general commercial law," 20 "general jurisprud-
ence," 21 "general rules of the common law," 2 2 or "general law,"
as in the case under discussion, there is little use in denying
its existence on a theoretical basis,2 3 when practically the courts
are constantly appealing to it.24 Confining themselves at first
17 Cf. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinions in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., supra note 5, at 370, 30 Sup. Ct. at 147, and in Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 222, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 531 (1917).
Is See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 658 (U. S. 1834). "The con-
ception of a federal common law has long since been exploded." Note
(1926) 40 HARv. L. Rsv. 310, n. 1. Despite this fact, it still has many
defenders. For a full treatment of the subject see Von Mozchzis er,
Common Law and ovr Federal JAriapudence (1925-1926) 74 U. or Pi.
L. REv. 109, 270, 367. A judge may dodge the obnoxious term by come
such phrase as "interstate common law." See Brewer, J., in Kanias v.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 667 (1907).
19 See Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1, 11 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909):
"The jurisdiction exercised by those federal courts in such cases is con-
current and not subordinate, and they are called upon to exercise, and
do exercise, an independent judgment as to what the law of the state
may be." Cf. 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONS~rrU'ioNAL LAw (1910) 1039.
20 See Swift v. Tyson, supra note 3, at 19; Brooklyn R. R. v. Nat.
Bank, 102 U. S. 14, 31 (1880).
21 See Lake Shore R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 106, 13 Sup. Ct.
261, 262 (1892).
2See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, aupra note 5, at 379, 13 Sup.
Ct. at 918.
23 General law "has no existence except in the brain of the federal
judges in their conception of what the law of the states should be."
Field, dissenting, in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, sitpra note 5, at 403,
13 Sup. Ct. at 928. "The theoretic view of a general commercial law
... does not exist and is not to be found in the books." 2 HL=n, op.
cit. supra, note 14, at 1108. "The doctrine of the federal courts as to
the general commercial law is without justification and without defenderz."
Carpenter, op. cit. supra note 4, at 603.
24R is Gray's theory that "the law is composed of the rules which the
courts ... lay down for the determination of rights and duties." GmY,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 84. Beale's theory is one of "a body of scientific
principle." 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF L,!ws (1916) § 117. Both theories
apparently could be brought to bear against Holmes's contention in the
case under discussion that "there is no such body of law." But there
is no doubt that, as applied, "the doctrine is anomalous and not explicable"
by any theory. Carpenter, loe. cit. su'pra note 23.
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to a sort of "law merchant" 25 of usages common to the com-
mercial world 28 the federal courts have applied their own rules
in an increasing field,27 without regard to the non-statutory law
of a state, feeling "dictated ... by the importance of national
certainty of the law in the broader field of general juris-
prudence." 28
It is hardly within the scope of this comment to discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of this practice.20  The claim for
uniformity5 " is not entirely justified- If it were, and if the
25 See Von Moschzisker, op. cit. supra note 18, at 283; DoBIE, FEDERAL
PROCEDURE (1928) 573.
26 See Brooklyn R. R. v. Nat. Bank, supra note 20, at 32.
27 The extension of the doctrine is threefold:
1. As shown by the development of the terms used almost any sub-
ject, however far from commercial law, may come within the scope of
"general law." Among these are questions of tort responsibility in the field
of negligence. New York N. H. & H. R. R. v. Fruchter, 271 Fed. 419
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 260 U. S.'141, 43 Sup.
Ct. 38 (1922) (dealing with the "attractive nuisance doctrine"). And
questions of procedure. Hemingway v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 114 Fed. 843
(C. C. A. 5th, 1902) (dealing with burden of proof.)
2. A state's statutes and statutory law are not considered binding
on the federal courts in an increasing number of cases. See Comment
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1121. The recent case of Peterson v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 19 F. (2d) 74 (S. I?. Iowa 1926), aff'd, 19 F. (2d) 88 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1927), seems to go as far as any case, in holding that the
federal courts are not bound by a state court's interpretation of any stat-
utes but those of a local nature. See in this connection Ware County
v. Nat. Surety Co., 17 F. (2d) 444, 445 (S. D. Ga. 1927).
3. The rule of Gelpeke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864), and
its developments in the field of statute law, extend the doctrine where
rights accrue before the state's decision. See Rand, op. cit. supra note 4.
Cf. Louisville T. Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896)
(validity of mortgage issued under a statute determined by federal court).
2s DOBm, op. cit. supra note 25, at 572,
29 It may be unconstitutional. See Hornblower, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 224. See Field, dissenting, in Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, aupra
note 5, at 401, 13 Sup. Ct. at 927.
3o See ROSE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1926), § 603.
For a forceful defense of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, as: confirming
the authority of the federal courts in the interests of uniformity, see
Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-made State Law in State
and Federal Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. Rav. 533.
1It is obvious that while uniformity in federal decisions is served
the result is diversity within a state. Cf. supra note 10. But it is
claimed that the federgl decisions will effect a stabilization of an uncer-
tain state rule. See Schofield, Uniformity of Law as an Anerican Ideal
(1908) 21 HARv. L. Rav. 583, 590. A state can still decide as it will,
however, notwithstanding the federal decision. Cf. McBride v. Farmers'
Bank, 26 N. Y. 450, 454 (1863): "We must follow these decisions although
they are in conflict with that of the federal court in Swift v. Tyson."
It may be argued that the field of diversity will be narrowed as the states
adopt uniform statutes, such as the Negotiable Instruments Law. But
such statutes would make for uniformity in any case. For a discussion
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,present enlargement of the scope of the doctrine into other fields
than that of strictly commercial, non-statutory law is desirable,
its proponents must face the prospect of a single national legal
system, which is, to say the least, revolutionary.2
Though the existence of any "general law" may perhaps be
doubted,33 it is important to discover, if possible, just what the
courts mean by "general" as distinguished from "local" law.
There have been many excellent classifications of the cases under
one or the other head,3 but they are of slight utility in deter-
mining in a new situation whether the question involved is
"general" or "local." :5 One of the leading writers on the sub-
ject could dogmatize no better than to say that what is not local
is general, and vice versau.- The categories are obviously a
posteriori.37 It must be remembered that there is no compulsion
on the federal courts.35 If they declare themselves bound, even
under the scope of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, it is a volun-
tary bondage, and it is natural that in most instances they so
declare themselves only when they are in accord with the state
rule-9
of the argument for uniformity, showing how the state courts refuse to
adopt an alternative federal ruling, see Frankfurter, op. cit. svpra note 4,
at 528.
-32 Cf. Meigs, op. cit. supra note 4, 73-75.
33 See svpra note 23.
1 See comprehensive classification, 3 FosrR, FEnr,%AL PwxviTcc (6th
ed. 1921) § 477; see also Comment (1924) 33 Y,='a L. J. S35.
35 "No one can possibly tell in advance ... whether the Supreme Court
will adhere in a particular case . . . to the state rule or not." Meigz,
op. cit. supra, note 4, at 67. For example the rule involved in the case
under discussion might well be considered both general and local. See
supra note 16.
30 Cf. in 3 F0sTER, op. cit. supra note 34, the statement at 2443 that,
"on questions of this nature [commercial law] cxctpt in the case of a.
local rule of property, the federal courts are not bound," with that at
2459, that "when decisions establish a rule of property they will be
followed, unless they relate solely to questions of commercial law." [Italics
-ours.)
37But once put in one or the other category, there being only a single
set of courts, the line of decisions on the question is likely to be regular.38 Cf. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, szpra note 12, at
463, 45 Sup. Ct. at 545.
39 "One has always the feeling that the real motive directing the court
is the determination to find in some way a reason for deciding the par-
ticular case as the chance majority may wish." Weigs, op. cit. ,vpr.
note 4, at 67. In the majority of cases to be sure the problem will not
arise, the federal courts following the state rules as a matter of course,
having none of their own. For the common law applied by the federal
courts can never be a complete system. See Domn, op. cit. -tpra note
25, at 577. Moreover they may entirely avoid making the difficult dis-
tinction if they are in accord with the state rule. Cf. Sim. v. Edenborn, 242
U. S. 131, 37 Sup. Ct. 36 (1916).
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The only consistency to be found is in the field of real and
personal property, so-called "rules of property" being considered
binding on the federal courts as local questions.4 But even
within the field of property there is little certainty due to the
fact that questions of "general law" are often involved. 4" And
because these property questions have been arbitrarily separated
from "general law," they are dealt with by the courts as some-
thing apart from the common law.42 In fact the courts seem
to feel that any distinctive local rule is a variant from the com-
mon law. In the final analysis when the courts speak of a
question as one of "local law," it means either that they think
the holding is correct, or that they think it is a variant which
they ought to follow. Consequently when they use the term
"general law," it may be merely a way of justifying a depar-
ture from what they consider an incorrect statement of the
law.4" This theory predicates, as Justice Holmes shows, an ideal
common law existing independently of any judicial authority."
40 Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, supra note 12 (ques-
tion regarding title); Guffey v. Smith, supra note 12 (lease); Jones
v. Third Nat. Bank, 13 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (chattel mort-
gage). The other "local" rules almost always seem to involve esseitially
commercial problems. Alabama Consol. Coal & I. Co. v. Baltimore Trust
Co., 197 Fed. 347 (D. Md. 1912) (powers and liabilities of corporations);
Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147 (1918)
(power of married woman to contract); Amer. Surety Co. v. Bellingham
Nat. Bank, 254 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (suretyship); Ohio v. Frank,
103 U. S. 697 (1880) (interest rates). Local public policy as a criterion
of a local rule is no more certain. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago
M. & St. P. R. R., supra note 16, at 100, 20 Sup. Ct. at 37.
41 See cases cited in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., supra note 5, at 361-
364, 30 Sup. Ct. at 144-145.
42 See Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Baugh, supra note 5, at 378, 13 Sup.
Ct. at 918: "The question is one of general law . . . There is in it
no rule of property, but it rests upon . .. the common law." See also
Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418, 428 (U. S. 1862). To distinguish
between rules of property and the common law seems unwarranted; in
evolving the rule of property, the state courts certainly claim in most
cases to be applying the common law.
- See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 506 (U. S. 1870). The ques-
tion of the dedication of a wharf to public use is said there not to
"depend upon state statute or local state law. The law which governs
the case is the common law, on which this court has never acknowledged
the right of the state courts to control our decisions, except . . . whore
the state courts have established, by repeated decisions, a rule of property."
This distinction likewise seems unwarranted.
44 In many cases, of course, the term "general law" will be applied and
the state ruling will still be followed, as the correct one. Salem Co. v.
Manufacturers' Finance Co., supra note 5.
-Von Moschzisker recognizes this and argues therefrom for a federal
common law. Von Moschzisker, op. cit. supra note 18. But it would seem
to be more than that. Cf. note 26 supra.
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But it is hard to reconcile with this theory, based as it is on
the desire for uniformity, the fact that, under the Judiciary
Act, state statutes, and their construction by the state courts,
are followed irrespective of how they differ from that ideal com-
mon law.46  If a state rule on a matter of commercial law is
evolved by the state's judiciary it is called "general" in the
federal courts, but if it is evolved by the legislature and put
on the statute books it is "local." 47
The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is at best a rough formula
to help in the difficult task of adapting a federal judicial sys-
tem to a union of sovereign states.48 The solution of the difficulty
seems to lie in the principle of comity. 9 The federal courts
have long recognized this,"0 and where doubt existed,51 or there
were no previous decisions in the federal courts, 2 have followed
the state courts as "persuasive' authority,03 even where claim-
ing the right of exercising an independent judgment.2 An
extension of this practice into such cases as the present, where
46 Cf. Holmes' dissent in this connection.
-"The meaning of statutes of a state" is a question "of local law."
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, supra note 12, at 462,
45 Sup. Ct. at 545.
48 See DOBI, op. cit. supra note 25, § 1. "Concurrence of jurisdiction"
is a difficult working theory.
49 Comity in fact seems fully as important as the Judiciary Act in lead-
ing a federal court to follow a state decision. Assuming that the usual
interpretation of the act is correct and that the word "laws" refers to
statutes only, in the field of non-statutory "local" law the binding effect
of state decisions must depend wholly on comity. In Bucher v. Cheshire
R. R., 125 U. S. 555, 8 Sup. Ct. 974 (1888), compare the statement at
583, that "rules of property . . .are to be treated as laws of the state
by the federal courts," referring apparently to "laws" in the Act, with
the statement at 584, that "decisions of the state courts that relate to
some law of a local character . . . are 2mizally conclusive and always
entitled to the highest respect of the federal courts." [Italics ours.] It has
even been suggested that the following of a state's statutory law by a
federal court is a matter of comity. See Hornblower, op. cit. -upra note
10, 212-220.
BO Occasionally a court will wait till the state court has announced its
local rule in a pending suit. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago 31. & St.
P. R. R., 62 Fed. 904 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1894), aff'd, 175 U. S. 91, 20
Sup. Ct. 33 (1899). Or it may even reverse itself after the rule has
been announced. Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 13 Sup. Ct. 466
(1893) (interpretation of statute of limitations).
- Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10 (1883).
52 Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 8 F. (2d) 078 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1926).
3 Ibid.
- After the Supreme Court in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., mtp;a note
5, with much difficulty came to the conclusion that a decision of the
state court on the question in hand was not binding, the Circuit Court of
Appeals, on the return of the case, followed the state decision. 170 Fed.
191 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910).
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the argument for a uniform commercial law seems not to apply,
even though the question may be one which has previously been
called one of "general law," would be welcomed.r'
EFFECT OF IRREGULARITIES IN AUTHORITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICIAL TO BORROW MONEY
Even the most common loan transaction between a bank and
a corporate borrower presents many interesting questions in
agency law. Assuming that the bank is satisfied with the bor-
rower's credit, and is willing to make the loan, what showing of
authority must it demand as to the power of the corporate
officer to sign the instrument evidencing the company's obliga-
tion? Is there any standard of what constitutes a sufficient
paper showing in this respect which, if relied upon by the bank,
will afford it protection even though the officer had no express
authority?
The problem involves two conflicting interests. On the one
hand, a corporation should not be bound if, as a matter of fact,
it has not given the official proper authority. On the other
hand, dealings in corporate paper would be seriously hampered
if, before a bank could be certain of the obligation of a cor-
poration, it would have to ascertain that there were no defects
whatsoever in the chain of authority." Thus, before relying on
a resolution of the board of directors giving the official the
requisite authority, it would- be necessary to determine whether
there had been a meeting of the board, whether it had been
validly called, whether the proper notice had been given
each director, and whether the resolution was properly passed
and properly recorded. Obviously, there must be certain situa-
tions in which a company is responsible for the acts of an
official, even though there are defects in his grant of authority.
Or, in other words, there must be some situations where an
officer may have power to bind the company without express
authority.2
55It has been suggested that Congress might well re-enact Section 34
of the Judiciary Act to cover decisions of state courts explicitly. See (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 855, 859. In Baltimore & 0. R, R. v. Baugh supra note 5 at
872, 13 Sup. Ct. at 915, one of the court's reasons for following the
Swift v.Tyson doctrine, was that Congress had never altered the Judiciary
Act after that case had so construed it.
'It is perhaps better to hold banks to a higher degree of inquiry than
ordinary persons. This suggestion is made in Isaacs, Business Postulates
and the Law (1928) 41 HAav. L. Rav. 1014, 1028, where it is pointed out
that a bank can and generally does demand evidence of authority when
dealing with a corporation.
2 In this discussion, "authority" is used primarily in the sense of "an
oral or written communication from the principal to the agent, expressing
an actual intention that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf in
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Two of these situations are fairly clear. The first arises
where a prior course of dealing by the official, of which both
the bank and the company have knowledge, justifies the infer-
ence that he has been given authority.: This may exist where
the bank has previously taken notes from the official, and the
company has recognized the validity of the obligation; 4 or where
it has been a custom for officials occupying that particular
position to do the act in question, and the bank is aware of the
custom; 5 or where the bank knows that the official has the
authority to do certain acts, from which authority to perform
the act in question is clearly implied.0 In these cases, many
courts will find that the official has the power to bind the com-
pany, although only as to those persons who are acquainted
with this appearance of authority-an appearance fostered by
the company. That the official has not actually been given the
authority, or even that the by-laws prohibit a grant of authority
to him, is not sufficient to excuse the company from responsibil-
ity under such circumstances.
7
The designation of an official as president, secretary, treas-
urer, or the like, does not of itself justify a bank in assuming
that he has authority. Such an official is generally held to lack
the power to bind a corporation by dealings with regard to
negotiable paper and similar instruments."
A bank is also accorded protection when the money received
on the instrument goes to the benefit of the corporation. Many
one or more transactions with third persons." Corbin, The Autthority of
an Agent-Definition (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 788. If the result is that
the act of the agent binds his principal, we shall say that he has the
power to do so. "Authority" is considered as descriptive of the operative
facts out of which the legal relation of power arises.
"Apparent authority." See MEcHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 720.
4 Foster v. Ohio-Colorado Mining Co., 17 Fed. 130 (D. Colo. 1883);
Produce Exch. Trust v. Bieberbach, 176 Mass. 577, 53 N. E. 162 (190);
Shawhan v. Shawhan Distilling Co., 195 Mo. App. 492, 197 S. W. 371
(1917).
5 Madeiran Alliance v. Lowell Trust Co., 237 Mass. S9, 129 N. E. 440
(1921) (no recovery allowed against bank, where it paid checks signed
by a new treasurer, after a prior course of dealing with the former
occupant of the office, in which course the company had acquiesced).
-Judell Co. v. Goldfield Realty Co., 32 Nev. 351, 103 Pac. 455 (1910);
McKinley v. Mineral Hill Consol. Min. Co., 46 Wash. 162, 89 Pac. 493
(1907).
7 FLECHER, Cyc. CORP. (1917) § 1931, and SuPP. (1924) § 1931.
8 For president, see FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. (1917) § 2037; THoPs.N,
CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) §§ 1586, 1588, 15S9; Note (1915) 63 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 684. For vice-president, FLDxCHER, op. cit. supra § 2006;
THOMPSON, op. cit. supra § 1619. For secretary, FLETCnrn, op. cit. apra
§ 2076; THOMPSON, op. cit. svpra § 1635. For treasurer, FLx=CEr,, op. cit.
supra §2089, THOMPSON, op. cit. supra § 1679. For general manager,
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra § 2111; THOMPSON, op. cit. Gupra § 1702.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
courts regard the acceptance of the benefit as a ratification of
the authority." A more generally applied remedy is an action
in quasi-contract for the actual benefit received but not for the
stated amount of the obligation. 0 The courts often deny such
a recovery by a narrow construction of "benefit." It has been
held that a company has received no benefit and so is not respon-
sible if the money merely went to replace company money that
an official had fraudulently converted to his own use.11 Credit-
ing money to the corporate bank account is not a benefit where
an official immediately thereafter fraudulently withdraws and
misappropriates it.12 This indefinite concept of "benefit" makes
it extremely difficult for banks to predict whether or not the
corporation will be held responsible on that theory. Further-
more, a recovery in quasi-contract would not include interest,
which is generally the entire consideration for the loan.
In the absence of facts on which to predicate the above actions,
there may be the situation, in which an individual, unknown
to the bank, seeks to borrow money in the name of a corpora-
tion, the by-laws of which provide for a grant of the requisite
authority, by resolution, to an official. The individual alleges
that he is such an official. 13  What documentary evidence of
authority will protect the bank in granting the loan? Where
there is involved the authority to sign contracts of indemnity
or guarantee bonds, to sign or assign mortgages, or accept or
indorse bills of exchange, the problem is substantially the same.
The English courts appear to have evolved a rule for this situa-
tion. In 1856, the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of Royal
British Bank v. Turquand,14 held that a company, whose deed
9 Stiewel v. Webb Press Co., 79 Ark. 45, 94 S. W. 915 (1906) 1 La
Normandie Hotel Co. v. Security Trust Co., 38 App. D. C. 187 (1912);
Galveston R. R. v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459 (U. S. 1870); of. Hutchinson v.
Rock Hill Real Estate & Loan, 65 S. C. 45, 43 S. E. 295 (1902).
10 Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98,
11 Sup. Ct. 36 (1890); Underwood v. Bank of Liverpool, [1924] 1 X. B.
775; Blackburn Bldg. Society v. Cunliffe Brooks & Co., 22 Ch. Div. 61
(1882); FLETCHER, op. cit. s'pra note 8, § 1455; cf. Industrial Say. Bank
v. People's Fun. Service, 296 Fed. 1006 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1924).
11 Merchants Nat. Bank v. Nichols & Shephard, 223 Ill. 41, 79 N. E.
38 (1906).
12 Fay v. Slaughter, 194 Ill. 157, 62 N. E. 592 (1902).
13 In all of these situations it is assumed that the company had the
authority to do the act involved. Questions of ultra vires are not con-
sidered.
This situation is peculiarly apt to arise under the prevalent prac-
tice of satisfying demands for evidence of authority by furnishing what
purport to be proper resolutions of the directors, although, in fact,
the directors have taken no action. See Susquehanna Line v. Auditorg,
infra note 36; Aetna Casualty & Surety v. American Brewing Co., infra
note 40.
146 E. & B. 327 (1856).
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of settlement allowed the directors to borrow on bond such
money as might be authorized by a resolution of a general meet-
ing of the company was responsible on a bond issued by the
directors even though no such resolution had been passed.
The court ruled that where authority (under the by-laws,
charter, or by statute) may be given by a resolution, third par-
ties may rely on an instrument which appears on its face to be
such a resolution.13 Or, as it has been restated by courts and au-
thorities, a third party is not held to notice of "internal irregu-
larities" not readily apparent to him in the granting of the
authority.0 If the officer in charge of the minutes certifies a
copy of what is supposed to be a resolution, the bank may rely
on its authenticity, and the company is bound even though the
resolution was never properly passed. The House of Lords
followed the rule some years later in holding that a corporation
was responsible on checks signed by two officials where its secre-
tary had falsely written the bank that the board had passed a
resolution authorizing them to sign." A later decision held
that a mortgage was a valid obligation of a company when
signed by two directors, although the board of directors, under
a by-law giving them power to fix the number of signatures
required, had passed a secret resolution making three the num-
ber.'8
In three recent English cases, the rule of the Turqu .d case,
as developed by the subsequent decisions, was recognized as law,
but each court excused the company from responsibility on some
other ground. In Kredit bazk Cassel v. Schwnkcrs," the Court
of Appeal held that a company was not responsible on bills
forged in its name by a branch manager, even though under
the by-laws he could have been authorized to draw such bills.
'5 "Parties dealing with limited companies are bound to read the statute
and deed of settlement. But they are not bound to do more. And the
party here, on reading the deed of settlement would find, not a prohibi-
tion against borrowing, but a permission to do so on certain conditions.
Finding that the authority might be made complete by a resolution, he
would have the right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that
-which on the face of the document appeared to be legitimately done."
Jervis, C. J., ibid. 332.
Ir The rule has been stated by several authorities, but little effort has
been made to collect the kinds of cases falling within it. See MEcHrS,,
op. cit. svpra note 3, § 762; THOM.iPSON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1799.
The most extensive discussion is that found in MOrLAWk z, PMlIVA=I Con-
PoRATioNs (2d ed. 1386) § 610.
17 Mahony v. E. Holyford Mining Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 869 (1875). There
was also some question as to whether the secretary who presented the
resolution had been validly elected.
28 County of Gloucester Bank v. Rudry Merthyr Steam, [1895] 1 Ch. 629.
29 [1927] 1 K. B. 826.
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It was held that the Turquand rule did not apply to the case
of forgeries.20 In Houghton & Co. v. Nothard, Lowe & Willis)"
the same court held that the mere fact that a director could
be given, authority to make an agreement under the by-laws
did not necessarily make the company responsible, under the
rule of the Turquand and subsequent cases. The fact that the
party dealing with the corporation was shown not to have relied
on the by-law was regarded as controlling. In the most recent
case, Liggett, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank,22 a bank paid checks signed
by an alleged director, after the president of the company had
notified the bank that this so-called director had been elected
to that office. The transaction appeared, on its face, to be in
accord with the by-laws, but actually there had been no valid
election. Wright, J., held that in the absence of notice, the bank
was justified in presuming, under the rule of the Turquan& case,
that the proper steps in the internal management necessary to
the election of a director had been followed. But as the jury
had found that the bank had notice of the defect, he sent the
case to a referee to determine how much "of the money had gone
to the benefit of the company, the element of notice having de-
feated recovery of the whole sum. 23 These cases would indicate
that the rule of the Turqund case is still the law in England,
in spite of a tendency to limit it in particular instances.
The American rule is less certain. Two years after the Tur-
quand decision, the United States Supreme Court, in a suit on
couhty bonds, cited and followed the rule of that case as to
internal irregularities. The Court held that from the issuance
of the bonds by the county commissioners, a purchaser could
presume that the vote of a certain proportion of citizens, re-
quired by the statutes as a prequisite to issuance, had been
secured. 2'
20 In doing so, the court followed Ruben v. Great Fingall Consol., [1906]
A. C. 439 (company not responsible on certificates of stock forged by secre-
tary, and pledged to secure his own debt), and held that the rule of Mahony
v. E. Holyford, supra note 17, did not apply to forgeries.
21 [1927] 1 K. B. 246, aff'd, House of Lords, 97 L. J. K. B. 76 (1927).
In the opinions of the House of Lords, no mention was made of the Tur-
quand case. The opinions there were based on tbe ground that the
third person had notice of the lack of authority. The decision of the
Court of Appeal is noted in (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 1010.
22 [1928] 1 K. B. 48.
23 The eagerness of Wright, J., to get the case out of the Turquand
rule may perhaps be explained by the fact that he was the trial judge
in both the Kreditbank and Houghton cases. His decisions therein, based
entirely on the rule of the Turquand case, were both reversed by the
Court of Appeal, and the reversal in the Houghton case was sustained
in the House of Lords.
24 County of Knox v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539 (U. S. 1858). In later de.
cisions the Supreme Court changed the reason for making such a finding,
considering that it should be based on the ground that the decision of the
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The Supreme Court, in 1898, followed this rule, holding a rail-
road corporation responsible on a contract of guaranty, even
though the board of directors had authorized the execution of
the contract without a petition from a majority of the stock-
holders, as required by statute.2- Banks purchasing bonds in
reliance on the resolution of the board of directors authorizing
the guaranty contract were held to be justified in presuming
from the resolution that the necessary petition had been pre-
sented.26 This decision was followed in a more recent case in a
lower federal court, purchasers of guaranty bonds being pro-
tected even though the board of directors of the company had
issued them without first securing a unanimous vote of the
stockholders, as required by statute.2 7  And on facts similar to
these, the rule of the Turqzu.wd case had been followed years
before in a state court where the company was held responsible
to a purchaser.
2
Where the person dealing with an official, however, sees no
resolution or purported resolution of the board of directors,
but relies merely on the fact that an official may be so authorized
under the by-laws, two federal courts have held the company
not responsible. Where a president could have been given power
to execute a note, but was not, a corporation was not respon-
sible on notes executed by him, there being no evidence of au-
thority except the inference arising from his acts.2 The court
indicated that if the board of trustees had authorized the presi-
dent to execute a note, the company would have been held, even
commissioners as to the validity of an election was binding, instead of
on the Turquand rule. For a discussion of this change, see MOn irz,
op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 612, 613. For the later view, see Quinlan v.
Green County, 205 U. S. 410, 27 Sup. Ct. 505 (1907).
25 Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552, 19
Sup. Ct. 817 (1898).
26 The court said, "One who takes from a corporation in good faith,
and without actual notice of any inherent defect, a negotiable obligation
issued by the board of directors... . disclosing upon its face no
want of authority, has the right to assume its validity, if the corporation
could, by any action of its officers or stockholders or of both, have au-
thorized the execution and issue of the obligation."
27 Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power Co., 190 Fed. 773 (N. D. N. Y.
1911). The court said, "It would be intolerable to hold that the ulti-
mate purchaser of a negotiable bond offered on the market and guaranteed
by another corporation is bound to go to the record of the corporation
executing the guaranty and ascertain at his peril that the requisite au-
thority has been given at a duly called meeting of its stockholders."
2s Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. C., C. & C. R. R., 41 Barb. 9
(N. Y. 1863).
29 St. Vincent College v. Hallett, 201 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912).
Humphrey, J., dissented on the ground that the failure to provide the
authorization was an internal irregularity, of which third partiez were
not bound to take notice under the Louisville Trust case, supra note 25.
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though the necessary authorization from the stockholders had
not been secured. In a similar case involving the execution of a
mortgage by a president, the company was likewise excused
from responsibility, the court stating that the rule of the Tur-
quand case did not apply.30 In this connection, it is to be noted
that a recital in the instrument, by an official, to the effect
that he has been given the necessary authority, has been held
not to bind the company.31
The rule of the Turquand case was recently relied on in
a federal court to hold a company responsible on a mortgage
which was purchased in reliance on a resolution of the board
of directors, even though the meeting at which the resolution
was adopted was illegal because of the absence of one director.
8 2
State courts have likewise refused to excuse a company from
responsibility because of a latent defect rendering the meeting
of the board invalid, where a person acted in reliance on a
resolution apparently valid on its face. 3
Decisions in the state courts are not numerous. Where by the
terms of its charter, a corporation was forbidden to borrow any
more than two-thirds of the amount of capital paid in, it was
held responsible on a mortgage given as security on bonds issued,
3OMaryland Finance Corporation v. Duvall, 284 Fed. '764 (C. C. A.
4th, 1922), With these cases cf. Kreditbank Cassel v. Schenkers, supra
note 19.
31 American Savings & Loan v. Smith, 122 Ala. 502, 27 So. 919 (1899).
But cf. Grant County State Bk. v. Northwestern Land Co., 28 N. D. 479,
150 N. W. 736 (1915), which would indicate that a third party could
rely on the statement if the officer was the one from whom inquiry as to
the granting of authority would have to be made. Compare also the
rule that an agent cannot establish his authority by his own representa-
tions.
32Lowenstein & Sons v. British-Am. Mfg. Co., 300 Fed. 853 (D. Conn.
1924).
- Barrell v. Lake View Land 'Co., 122 Cal. 129, 54 Pac. 594 (1898)
(evidence inadmissible to show that meeting was held in wrong place,
and no notice given); Sferlazzo v. Oliphant, 24 Cal. App. 81, 140 Pac.
289 (1914) (two directors absent-presumption of validity from resolu-
tion itself held sufficient to defeat nonsuit on note); cf. Hutchinson v.
Rock Hill Real Estate & Loan, 65 S. C. 45, 43 S. E. 295 (1902); Hartley
v. Ault Woodenware Co., 82 W. Va. 780, 97 S. E. 137 (1918). In each
case, a company was held responsible for obligations incurred by officers
from persons relying on forged resolutions of the board of directors, that
is, on certified copies of resolutions that actually were never passed. How-
ever, in each case there was some evidence that the benefit went partly,
at least, to the company, and this factor had considerable effect on the
courts.
Cf., also, Baker v. Marvel Creek Mining Co., 5 Alaska 348 (1915)
(mortgage given by three directors held valid, though other two were
not notified. The company received an indirect benefit, but the court
seemed to feel that the purchaser would nevertheless be justified in relying
on the validity of the mortgage).
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although the amount borrowed was in excess of the prescribed
amount 4  The court cited the Turquzod rule to sustain its view
that third persons could rely on the fact that the condition had
been complied with, from the issuance of the bonds by those
officers who alone kmew whether or not the condition had
been met.35 In another case, the secretary of a company fraudu-
lently altered a valid resolution so as to give him the power to
assign mortgages. The company was held responsible on a mort-
gage so assigned despite the fraud.26 But a mortgage authorized
by resolution of the board of directors has been held invalid
where the meeting was not held in the state, as required by
statute.37 The same decision obtained where a meeting was in-
valid because of the lack of proper notice to one director.-3
There is little authority in this country as to the form the
resolution must be in in order to enable a bank to rely on
its validity. It has been held that a person must see the resolu-
tion or a written copy of it, and cannot rely on the statement
of the secretary that one was passed 30 One court has held that
the resolution must be valid on its face, that is, must contain
nothing which shows that the meeting at which the resolution
was passed was invalid. 0 Another court has held that the
341Hackensack Water Co. v. DeKay, 36 N. J. Eq. 548 (1883).
35 The court said, "Persons dealing externally with those managing the
affairs of the company in a manner which appears to be perfectly con-
sonant with the articles of association, are not to be affected by any
irregularities which take place in the internal management of the com-
pany. They are entitled to presume that that of which only they can
have knowledge, namely, the external acts, is rightfully done, when tho~e
external acts purport to be performed in the mode in which they ought
to be performed." Ibid. 565.
36 Commonwealth v. Reading Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 431 (1884); cf.,
also, Whiting v. Wellington, 10 Fed. 810 (D. Mass. 1882); Holden v.
Phelps, 141 Mass. 456, 5 N. E. 815 (1886); Holden v. Whiting, 29 Fed.
881 (D. Mass. 1887), all based on the same facts involved in the Reading
Bank case, and all reaching the same result as far as the responsibility
of the company is concerned. Cf. Susquehanna Line v. Auditore, 229 N.
Y. Supp. 181 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1928), where a bank cashed a check
signed by a director payable to himself, in reliance on a purported rezolu-
tion signed by the secretary and vice-president that such checks chould
be honored. The resolution had been altered from the form as originally
passed. The court held that the wording of the resolution plus notice
of a suit to restrain the transfer of the money should have put the bank
on inquiry.
37 State Nat. Bank v. Union Nat. Bank, 168 Ill. 519, 48 N. E. 82 (1897).
38 Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy, 55 Ark. 473, 18 S. W. 759 (1892).
39 Franklin v. Havalena Mining Co., 18 Ariz. 201, 157 Pac. 986 (1916)
(secretary stated that board of directors had authorized him to exCcute
lease, though no such resolution had been passed. He had forged one
on the minute books, but the plaintiff did not see the books).
40 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Am. Brewing Co., 63 Mont. 474, 203
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persons who sign the copy of the resolution, must in fact have
been officers at its date.41 In this connection, it should be noted
that the courts tend to construe resolutions dealing with the
authority to handle negotiable instruments strictly in favor of
the principal, which in this case is the corporation.
42
All that can be said of the decisions is that in a few isolated
fact situations, the rule of the Turquand case has been followed.
The tendency seems to be to decide each case on its own merits.
It would certainly promote business convenience, and facilitate
commercial transactions, if a bank dealing with a corporate
officer knew that if it secured certain instruments from certain
officials it could feel safe in the knowledge that it had the obliga-
tion of the corporation, even though there were some defect in
the authorization of the officials. On the other hand, to hold a
corporation responsible to a bank which relies on what appears
to be a valid resolution of the board of directors, signed by its
secretary, might appreciably increase the use of spurious resolu-
tions by its officers. Such, however, does not appear to have been
the result of the rule as applied in England.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
In the recent case of Willing v. Chicago Auditoiiuum Ass'n,
48 Sup. Ct. 507 (U. S. 1928), the Supreme Court has strength-
ened the inference drawil from the opinion in the first Liberty
Warehouse case,1 that an attempt by "Congress to authorize the
federal courts to render declaratory judgments might be held
unconstitutional, for the Supreme Court has suggested three
times, in dicta,2 that actions for declaratory judgments do not
constitute "cases" or "controversies" within the meaning of
Article 3 of the Federal Constitution relating to the exercise
of the judicial power.3
Pac. 921 (1922) (resolution stated that meeting was called by directors,
but by-laws required that president must call all meetings).
4' Northville State Bank v. Detroit Silver Refining Co., 181 Mlich. 515,
148 N. W. 175 (1914) (resolution signed by person not president at its
date is not admissible in evidence).
42 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 969.
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282
(1927); Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 845.
2 See Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 48 .Sup. Ct. 507, 509 (U. S.
1928) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. y. Burley Tobacco Growers Ass'n, 276
U. S. 71, 89, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 294 (1928); Liberty Warehouse Co. v.
Grannis, supra note 1, at 74, 47 Sup. Ct. at 283.
3 "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority... to ,Controversies
... between citizens of different states . . . " U. S. CoNsT., Art. 3, § 2.
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In the many jurisdictions which have adopted the declaratory
judgment 4 the AuditorunL suit would be regarded as a proper
case for its application5 Lessees of land for a long term erected
a building thereon, and when it became inadequate for their
needs, proposed to demolish it and erect a new structure. The
landlord disputed the tenants' privilege to so rebuild, and thereby
imposed an insuperable obstacle to the undertaking. The tenants
brought an action to remove what they alleged to be a cloud on
their title. The District Court dismissed the bill.( That decree
was reversed in the Circuit Court of Appeals" on the ground
that the doubt created by the landlord's position with respect
to the construction of the lease constituted a removable cloud.,
On certiorari to the Supreme Court the decree of the Circuit
Court was reversed on the ground that, there being no remov-
able cloud, this was in effect a suit for a declaratory judgment.
Although the court might have based its decision on the absence
of authority from Congress to render declaratory judgments, it
chose to repeat the broader dictum referred to above,--a dictum
clothed with importance in view of the pending Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act which passed the House on January 25,
1928.10
Certain authorities " are cited by the Court to show that
resort to equity to remove such doubts is a proceeding which
was unknown to either English or American courts at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution and for more than half a
This section defines the scope of the judicial power. See Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475 (U. S. 1793).
4 For a discussion of the declaratory judgment in England and other
countries see Borchard, The Declaratory Juidgment-A Nccdcd Pioccdnrzl
Reform (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 1. For a list of the juriEdictions in the
United States which have adopted the action by statute see Commcnt
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 473. The number is now twenty-three.
ZFor similar cases involving the construction of leases see Young v.
Ashley Gardens, Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 112; Girard Tr. Co. v. Tremblay Motor
Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 AtI. 506 (1928); Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Micc.
469, 205 N. Y. Supp. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
G Chicago Auditorium Ass'n v. Cramer, 8 F. (2d) 998 (D. Ill. 1925).
7 Chicago Auditorium Ass'n v. Willing, 20 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927).
SNotes (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 109; (1928) 26 Mfica. L. rxv. 426;
(1927) 41 HARv. L. R-v. 104; (1927) 76 U. OF P,. L. Ruv. 217.
9"But still the proceeding is not a case or controversy within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Constitution." 'Willing v. Chicago Audi-
torium Ass'n, supra note 2.
'2 Bill H. R. n. 5623 (70th Congress, Ist Session). It would authorize
the federal courts to render declaratory judgments "in cases of actual
controversy."
11 See Cross v. DeValle, 1 Wall. 1, 14 (U. S. 1863); Jachlson v. Turnley,
1 Drew. 617, 627 (1853); Rooke v. Lord Kensington, 2 K. & J. 73% 760
(1856); Lady Langdale v. Briggs, S DeG., B1. & G. 391, 42T (1336).
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century thereafter. Two of these cases dealt with future rights
and are not applicable. 12  The other two refused to declare
present rights where no consequential relief could be given, for
such was never the practice, as was said in Jackson v. Turnley.2
But there is a distinction between the practice 14 of the court and
the jurisdiction of the court.5 It is admitted that before the
"1883 Rules of Court" 16 the equity courts did not make such
declarations, but this practice does not prove that there was no
jurisdiction to do so. This distinction was drawn by the English
Court of Appeal in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay,"7 when it
held that Order XXV, Rule 5,18 giving the Court power to make
declaratory judgments, did not extend its jurisdiction. As
Bankes, L. J., said:
"It was in this latter sense [the loose sense of 'no jurisdiction'
-where the court has power, but does not choose, to entertain
some matter in dispute on the ground that it is not matter
proper or convenient for it to adjudicate upon] I think that
the Vice Chancellor was speaking in the case of Rooke v. Lord
Kensington, when he says that there was no jurisdiction in
the Court of Chancery before the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852,
to make a simple declaration of right where no consequential
relief was claimed. I cannot doubt that, had the Court of Chan-
cery of those days thought it expedient to make mere declaratory
judgments they would have claimed and exercised the right to
do so." 19
Such is the construction placed by the English Court of Appeal
upon a case relied upon in the Auditorium case to support a
dictum to the opposite effect. Unless matters of practice and
12 Cross v. DeValle, and Lady Langdale v. Briggs, supra note 11.
13Supra note 11, at 626. Having determined that such was not the
practice before the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852, the court then
construed the act as authorizing declaratory judgments only in cases
where consequential relief could be awarded. The pertinent portion of
the act provides that "it shall be lawful for the Court to make binding
declarations of right, without granting consequential relief." (1852) 15
& 16 Vict. c. 86.
14 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 153. Equity juris.
diction, in the strict sense, is here defined as "the power residing in such
court to determine judicially a given action, controversy, or question pre-
sented to it for decision." From this is distinguished another use of
the term referring to "the power to hear certain kinds and classes of
civil cases according to the principles, of the method and procedure adopted
by the court of chancery .... " Ibid. 156.
15 Article 3 of the Federal Constitution deals with jurisdiction in the
strict sense. See note 14 supra.
1- Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883.
17 [1915] 2 K. B. 536.
is Supra note 16.
19 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, supra note 17, at 568.
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procedure 20 are to be confused with jurisdiction, the soundness
of the dictum in the Avditorih2n case should be gauged ex-
clusively by the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court-that is
to say, the scope of the terms "case" and "controversy." 21
The legislature may, by providing an appropriate form of pro-
ceeding, extend the power of the court to any class of cases
involving a controversy between citizens of different states.- '
Hence it would seem that the constitutionality of the declaratory
judgment in the federal courts depends upon whether those well
defined classes of situations regarded as suitable for declaratory
adjudication 23 present controversies.
What, then, are the elements of a controversy? In the course
of our judicial history certain tests have been laid down. First,
the dispute must be such that a judgment rendered will be con-
clusive and binding.24 Second, there must be a specific, - 7 live '-
issue between adverse parties.-2 7  And third, this issue must in-
volve substantial legal interests.2
20 The use in Article 3 of the Constitution of the word "controverzics"
in contradistinction to the word "cases," and the omission of the word
"all" in respect to controversies, left it to Congress to define the con-
troversies over which the courts it was empowered to create and establish
might exercise jurisdiction, and the manner in which this was to be
done. Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 25 Sup. Ct. 6 (1904). Thus,
Congress possesses the sole right to say what shall be the forms of pro-
ceeding in the courts of the United States. Ex Parte New Orleans City
Bank, 3 How. 292 (U. S. 1845); Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632 (U. S.
1835).
21 An act of Congress cannot e-xtend the jurisdiction of the federal courts
beyond the limits defined by the Constitution. Dred Scott v. Sandford,
19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303 (U. S.
1809).
22 Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10 (1875); Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall.
270 (U. S. 1871).
23 For a collection of various types of declaratory judgment cases see
Borchard, op. cit. supra note 4, at 105.
24 Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1864).
25 New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 46 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926).
28 The jurisdiction does not extend to imaginary issues framed for the
purpose of involving the advice of the court without real parties or a
real case. Musk-at v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250 (1911) ;
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445
(1923). Nor does it extend to moot cases. United States v. Hamburg
American Line, 239 U, S. 466, 36 Sup. Ct. 212 (1915); Director of Prisons
v. Court of First Instance, 239 U. S. 633, 36 Sup. Ct. 220 (1915).
South Spring Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mlining Co.,
145 U. S. 300, 12 Sup. Ct. 921 (1892); Filer v. Levy, 17 Fed. 609 (C. C.
La. 1883). The requirement is not met by a suit ancillary to a judgment
or pending suit in a state court.
28 This excludes purely political questions. Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923). And cases where the interest
of the plaintiff is too minute or uncertain. Stearns v. Woods, 236 U. S.
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Although all of these elements were present in the Auditorium
case,29 the court insisted that, until the defendant has either in-
jured the plaintiff or shown himself to be on the verge of doing
so no judicable controversy exists. 0 It is not clear whether the
Court held this essential to the maintenance of the'suit by reason
of the lack of a statute authorizing the declaratory action, or
by reason of Article 3. But the caveat of Justice Stone in
his concurring opinion,31 read in connection with certain portions
of the majority opinion, compels the, belief that, although un-
necessary to the disposition of the case,32 the latter was intended.
To be sure, the plaintiff who seeks consequential relief must
show his injury, and he who seeks the injunction must show
a threat. But there are other modes of relief applicable in the
absence of such injury or threat.3 3 The jurisdiction to relieve
owners of real property from vexatious claims or even the
grounds for possible future claims is inherent in equity.34  Jus-
tice Field has pointed out that in actions to quiet title it was
not necessary that such title should have been controverted or
assailed.35 For the very raison d'etre of such actions has always
been to protect the property owner from depreciation in value
due to the existence of adverse claims not then being presented
in such manner as to furnish ground for an action at law.30
Such conditions to the exercise of this jurisdiction as have from
time to time been prescribed by the courts 3 7 may be dispensed
with by the legislatures without thereby enlarging the juris-
diction of equity.2 8 Thus the action for the construction of a
75, 35 Sup. Ct. 229 (1915); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43
Sup. Ct. 597 (1923); cf. Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D. C. 453 (1898).
29 Supra note 2.
30 Ibid.
31-"I concur in the result. But it is unnecessary, and I therefore am
not prepared, to go further and say anything in support of the view
that Congress may not constitutionally confer on the federal courts juris-
diction to render declaratory judgments .... " ibid.
32 See Grinnell, The Anticipatory Declaratory Opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States that the Rendering of Declaratory Judgments
Was Not Within The Constitutional Jurisdiction of That Court (1928) 13
MAss. L. Q. 43.
33 4 POMROmY, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 3303.
34Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720 (1892); Howard,
Bills to Remove Cloud From. Title (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 109.
35 Sharon v. Tucker, supra note 34, at 543, 12 Sup. Ct. at 722; Fidelity
Nat. Bank v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511 (1927).
36 Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. 495 (1884).
37 Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. 652 (1906); Boise
Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup.
Ct. 426 (1909). But cf. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 26 Sup. Ct. 427
(1906).38 Bardon v. Land & River Impr. Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 Sup. Ct. 650
(1895); Holland v. Challen, supra note 36; Case of Broderick's Will,
21 Wall. 503 (U. S. 1874); see Borchard, op. cit. supra note 4, at 30.
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will has been extended by statute to deeds and other written
instruments, where no other relief is given,30 and where no ques-
tions of trust are involved. 4 A Connecticut statute has provided
for an action by any claimant of an interest in real or personal
property against any adverse claimant to determine such adverse
claim and quiet title.41 A M innesota statute permits the holder
of a fee title to bring an action against the holder of a tax title
to determine such claim without, as was formerly necessary,
paying into court the amount for which the land was sold at
the tax sale.1 There is also the equitable action to establish
and confirm title in the case of lost records and under other cir-
cumstances. 43 There is the action by which an equitable claim-
ant may obtain a judgment impressing a trust upon the legal
title in his favor, and the action to declare a supposed trust
invalid.7 There are actions to affirm the validity of a marriage
denied or doubted by the other party.' And on occasions in-
junctions have issued against the mere existence of unconstitu-
tional statutes, in one case even where the statute was not to go
into effect for several years.47 Where new equitable rights have
been thus created in the states by statutory extensions of exist-
ing remedies the federal courts have occasionally given them
effect.48 When our courts are daily adjudicating such suits on
their merits, can it be questioned that cases or controversies are
therein presented? In so far as no other relief is awarded these
are in effect declaratory judgments. The declaratory action is
merely a new name for a form of remedy thus long kmown to
English and American practice.
With the exception of the Anway case in Michigan - the state
-2In re Ungaro's Will, 88 N. J. Eq. 25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917). The
court regards this statute as effecting an e.xtension of the remedy rather
than of jurisdiction.
4 0 Barton v. Barton, 283 Ill. 338, 119 N. E. 320 (1918) ; ILL. R1v. STAT.
(Cahill, 1927) c. 22, § 50.
'.Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Tr. Co., 91 Conn. 500, 100 Atl.
22 (1917); CONN. GEN. STA!.T. (1918) § 5113.
-Deaver v. Napier, 139 Blinn. 219, 166 N. W. 187 (1918); Mxim,.
STAT. (Mlason, 1927) c. 82, § 9556.
43 ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 116, § 16.
4'Porten v. Peterson, 139 Blinn. 152, 166 N. W. 183 (1918); Donohoe
v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 700, 144 Pac. 958 (1914).
- Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Blich. 630, 165 N. W. 660 (1917).
46 Wis. ST..T. (1927) § 247.03; Kitzman v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 303, 166
N. W. 789 (1918).
47 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925);
see Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 845, S50.
4 8 Supra note 38. But cf. Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 15 Sup.
Ct. 129 (1894), as to how far such statutes conflict with the Constitutional
provision entitling parties to a trial by jury.
4 9Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry., 211 Mlich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920),
12 A. L. R. 26 (1921); Comment (1926) 35 YA=E L. J. 473.
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courts have uniformly upheld the constitutionality of declaratory
judgment acts, with emphasis on the fact that such actions pre-
sent a justiciable issue, adverse parties, and a final judgment,"'
-in short, a case or controversy. The same conclusion was
reached by the English Court of Appeal in the leading Hannay
case referred to above.51 There the question was whether the
Rules Committee had power to authorize the courts to entertain
such suits where no consequential relief could be had. The
court held that it had such power, as the declaratory action in-
volved merely an extension of practice and procedure, not of
jurisdiction. Thus the promulgation of a simple rule of court
was all that was required in England to adopt the declaratory
action. The Judicial Council of Massachusetts appears to feel
that no more is required to adopt it in that state.1
2
The fears entertained by the court in the Anway case that
the action might not be confined to actual controversies have
been dispelled. It should be noted that the proposed federal act
begins with the phrase, "In cases of actual controversy." Now
that over two thousand declaratory judgment cases have been
disposed of by the English and Dominion courts, and several
hundred by the American state courts, the nature of the action
is no longer a matter of conjecture. So far we have been speak-
ing of cases in which no other relief beyond the declaratory
judgment is asked or could be had. But there is another type
of declaratory judgment case-and, as it happens, a far more
common type in the courts which render declaratory judgments,
-in which the milder form of relief is sought in lieu of or as an
alternative to consequential or injunctive relief.V3 A fortiori
the suits of this second type present cases or controversies.
Should the question of the constitutionality of the proposed
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act be presented to the Supreme
Court, it is to be hoped that the extremely narrow construction
placed by way of dicta upon the terms "case" and "controversy"
may not be hardened into precedent to bar this useful action
from the federal courts.
5o Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495 (1923); Miller v.
Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965 (1924); Kariher's Petition, 284
Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925); see Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 845,
847.
51 Supra note 17.
52 "A method of gradual experiment under rules of court will be the
simplest method of proceeding [to adopt the declaratory judgment] ...
We believe that a statute thus extending the rule-making power of the
court to provide for such procedure would avoid the feeling in the minds
of some members of the bar that a statute such as the proposed Uniform
Act ... might involve an uncertain extension of the relative jurisdictionu
of the courts of law and equity." Third Report of the Judicial Council of
Massachusetts, 57.
53 See Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 403.
